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Nunley v. Daunt less (Cont.)

was a non-negligent owner and had abandoned its vessel before
the Dauntless collision . . . [Combi I was free from negligence. "
The three prong test set out for determining a valid salvage
claim includes "(2) voluntary service rendered when not re
quired as an existing duty or from a special contract. " The
Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 (1880). The district court found that
Nunley's actions were not voluntary but rather were required
by the contract ChemLink had entered into to supply tugs,
pumps, and manpower to remove oil and water from the Dauntless.
ChemLink's agreement contemplated that the efforts of Nunley
would be utilized. As vice president he was often required to be on
call 24 hours a day. Thus his claim to be working independently
as a salvor, as opposed to working as per his contract, failed.
The River and Harbor Act, 33 U.S.C. §409 (the Wreck Act),
provides that, "when a vessel . . . is wrecked and sunk . . .
accidentally or otherwise it shall be the duty of the owner . . . to
immediately mark it with a buoy or beacon." On January 30,
1974, the buoy that the Coast Guard had initially placed on the
vessel was reported missing and the Coast Guard replaced it
with a second larger buoy. Less than one month later the second
buoy was reported missing. After the Dauntless's accident the
Coast Guard maintained another buoy at the site of the wreck.
Because the Coast Guard's first set of marking expenses was
within three weeks of the sinking of Lash and at that time
Combi was not considered to have abandoned it, the Coast
Guard was entitled to recover for the first two markings. How
ever, there is no recovery for the last buoy. By 1977 Combi had
abandoned the sunken vessel.

claiming that his dewatering efforts were performed in an indi
vidual capacity not as a representative of ChemLink.
ISSUES: (I) Was Combi negligent in failing to conduct a good
faith search for its barge prior to its decision to abandon if'
(2) Is the Coast Guard entitled to recover for its
marking expenses?
( 3) Does Captain Nunley have a valid salvage claim"1

This court affirmed the district court and held
that Combi used its best efforts to search for its sunken barge.
The first day after the "barge breakaway" Combi joined the
Coast Guard in a helicopter search. Subsequently it employed a
skilled magnometer and fathometer reader to search under the
water. The only option Combi did not employ was that of divers.
However, river conditions were not conducive to a human
search team. According to trial testimony, those river condi
tions lasted well into the summer of 1974, months after the
breakaway.
As to the claim of abandonment by Combi, the district court
noted that, "a valid abandonment occurs through the act of
deserting the property without hope of recovery or intention of
returning to it." In this case more than three years had elapsed
since Combi ended its search and the Dauntless's accident. "In
that interval Combi may safely be deemed to have abandoned
the [Lash]."
In February, 1974 Combi notified its insurers that it had failed to
locate the barge and stated its intent to abandon it. "Since Combi
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STEPHE NSON v. Mc LEA N CO NTRACTI NG COMPA NY
Unite dStates Court of Appeals, Fourt h Circuit, 2 3 December 1988
863F.2d 34 0
An in divi dual injured w hile wor king on a crane barge to construct a bridge does not sustain his in jury from an
unseawort hy vessel in navigable waters nor does he quali fy as a "seaman " under t he Jones Act .
FACTS: Stephenson, the plaintiff-appellant was an employee
of the McLean Contracting Company (McLeanJ which was
building a bridge across the Choptank River in Maryland. He
was assigned to the Annapolis, a crane barge being used as a
plattorm to construct the bridge's support columns. He was
injured March 26, 1986 while using a cutting torch on pilings in
a cofferdam, a box-like structure designed to keep the river's
water from the work area. Stephenson lost his tooting on some
loose gravel, precipitating a fall to the bottom of the cofferdam,
which was alongside another crane barge owned and used by
McLean. The fall resulted in injuries for which he now sues.
Stephenson brought this action in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. App.§688 (aJ, and the maritime doctrine of unseaworthi
ness. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment because Stephenson did not meet the definition of a
··seaman·· as set forth in the three prong test of Whitting ham u.
Sewer Construction Co.541 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1976l and addition
ally because the plaintiff was injured in the cofferdam which
was not part of the vessel. The plaintiff appealed.

Does a crane barge used as a platform to aid in the
construction of a bridge constitute an "unseaworthy appurtenance
of a vessel in navigable water·· which would allow recovery under
the doctrine of unseaworthiness?

ISSUE :

In affirming the dismissal, the Fourth Circuit
examined the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App.§688 (a), which provides:
"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
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of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action
for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury . . . ."
The test the court of appeals used to determine if Stephenson
met the definition of a "seaman" was first set out in Whittingham
v. Sewer Construction Co. 541 F.2d at 436. There, the court
determined under a three prong test that a worker must be a
·· permanently attached" crew member of a vessel in navigable
waters to qualify as a "seaman" under the Jones Act. The court
of appeals followed the district court's assumption that
Stephenson was permanently attached to the Annapolis and
that it was in navigation, satisfying the first prong of the Whit
tingham test. Stephenson's duties in constructing the
framework of the bridge such as welding and cutting pilings did
not serve·· naturally and primarily as an aid to navigation" thus
tailing to meet the second prong of the Whittingham test. The
court found that the plaintiff as a bridge construction worker, in
performing functions unrelated to the tasks of transportation,
tailed to meet the test of a "seaman" as set forth in Whittingham.
The court also determined that Stephenson's unseaworthiness
claim did not present a genuine issue of material fact to go to the
JUry. For recovery under the maritime doctrine of unseaworthi
ness, the court again looked to Whittingham, where the plaintiff
must show he was "doing the work of a seaman" and that his
injury was caused by an "unseaworthy appurtenance of a vessel
in navigable waters." Deciding that plaintiffs claim was without
merit, the court concluded that Stephenson was a bridge con
struction worker when injured, not a seaman, and also that he
was not working on a vessel, but working on an independent
work site, the cofferdam, when he was injured.
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